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PANEL DISCUSSION: A COMPARISON OF LEY DE QUIEBRAS Y
SUSPENSI6N DE PAGOS WITH THE NEW LEY DE
CONCURSOS MERCANTILES
MODERATOR: MICHAEL L. OWEN, ESQ.*
Panelists: Prof. Nathalie Martin, Orlando Loera, Douglas Doetsch, Esq., Lic. Jose
Maria Abascal, Lic. Luis Manuel M~jan, Stephen Kargman, Anthony McCarthy
OWEN: We are going to lead off with a panel discussion following up on the
presentations on the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles (Business Reorganization Law)'.
We have the great honor of adding two additional people to our panel who did not
give presentations. One of them is Mr. Orlando Loera. In addition, we have with
us Mr. Steve Kargman. We are delighted to have these two additions to our panel,
and as indicated earlier, we wanted to start off with some questions amongst
ourselves and then we are going to follow up with about a half-hour of questions
from the audience. I would like to lead off with a question for Professor Natalie
Martin. You read down a list, at the end of your presentation, a list of the elements
of Chapter 11 bankruptcy law in the United States that almost is a list of all of the
evils of the suspension of payments procedure that used to exist in Mexico. My
query to you is: if our system in the United States has all of those evils, why does
it work?
MARTIN: I did not think I was really necessarily talking about all the evils.
However, it is maybe a little evil to have a case going on for six or seven years. So,
I think the question that I am being asked is, why is it that if we do not have these
extra protections that have now been provided in the new, revised Mexican
insolvency law, why does the United States system work? The main reason is that
in the United States we have a tremendous amount of secured debt. There are very
few, because you can now get almost anything as collateral for a loan and very few
debtors have a lot of unencumbered assets in the United States. So how does this
make our cases move more swiftly? What you generally see is that you have a
secured creditor in a case that is very powerful and has a security interest in most of
the assets. So the case is filed and it starts on its merry path. Of course the judge
wants the case to do well, so it is allowed to survive for a while. But you always
have the secured creditor, the extremely well protected secured creditor under
American law in the background getting ready to move to lift the stay, either
because the collateral values are diminishing or because the case is going on too
long and there is no possibility of a successful rehabilitation. It is really, for the
most part, one of the main reasons why our cases move along so quickly. There is
normally a very active and well-protected secured creditor who can exercise its
rights and move the case along.
LOERA: Mr. Owen, the beauty of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and its lack in Mexico is noteworthy.
OWEN: Sure.
DOETSCH: I want to ask a follow-up question for Prof. Martin on United States
bankruptcy law and what makes things move along. We do have something that no
* A summary of the background of each participant in this panel follows on the last page of the discussion.
1. Business Reorganization Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), Diario Oficial de la Federacion, Article
1, et seq, May 12, 2000.
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one has mentioned yet today in United States bankruptcy law, which is somewhat
analogous to the time period that is built into the new Ley de Concursos Mercantiles
(Business Reorganization Law) which are exclusive, limited periods for the debtor
to present its plan, although they are often not adhered to.
MARTIN: What the code says is that the debtor, and the debtor only has-and
I'm talking about the merchants, obviously, under Mexican law-has the exclusive
right to file a plan for a 180 days following the petition.2 So that means for six
months, only the debtor can file a reorganization plan, and that keeps everyone else
at bay. Now, what actually Mr. Doetsch just asked me, isn't that a time limit? That
seven or eight-year case mentioned in my presentation, it actually happens to be a
very large asbestos manufacturer in the United States. We actually were able to
maintain exclusivity for the seven years. That means nobody-if the code says 180
days, this one really is operating in the breach. It says you cannot continue to
maintain that exclusive right to file a reorganization plan more than 180 days except
for costs. Which, in my own experience, is that in the beginning they rubber-stamp
that and say, "well, of course you need the exclusive right to file a plan for longer
than six months." Then they just enter an order extending it, and it just can go on in
that sort of status quo mode for a long, long time. So it is really not adhered to very
carefully.
OWEN: It seems also that one of the real reasons is the recognition of credit
process. Here in Mexico, under the suspension of payments, the recognition of
credit process is the element that most frequently was used to drag it out for years
and years. Prof. Martin, could you give just a brief summary of how that differs in
the United States?
MARTIN: The process is very different. One of the main things that the revision
in Mexico has done is to take the emphasis off of all of these claims resolution
process that can drag out endlessly and put the emphasis on the plan process instead.
That is very similar to what is done in the United States. Because the theory is, who
cares? The claims resolution process in the United States is actually done at the end.
The theory is: you are not going to pay all these claims anyway. You will pay some
percentage on them, but in terms of where your time is best spent, it is better to just
go ahead, get in there, figure out how you are going to get the company out of
bankruptcy, and you will have them file their claims towards the end of that process
and adjudicate them then. So there is a difference, as I understand the current or
even the new reorganization law. In the beginning of the case, it is anticipated that
you are going to be doing the claims process along with the conciliation process.
In the United States, it is done afterwards, and you could say, "how can you propose
a plan if you don't know how much the claims are?" But actually, you just sort of
guess at that.
ABASCAL: The reason is because we needed the claims there and whatever
their preference is, that must be settled before the agreement is agreed upon in order
to proceed with the reorganization. So what we did was to de-judicialicize the
problem and convert it in what it really must be, that is, an assessment by the
accountants of the books and documents of the debtor, with the documents provided
2. Business Reorganization Law (Ley 4e Concursos Mercantiles), Diari Oficial de la Federacion, Article
145, May 12, 2000.
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by the creditors that want to do that. In a very short period of time, the conciliator
must produce a provisional list and that list is published by the judge and the
creditors have about ten days. But the terms are very short to make observations and
then the conciliator has around another ten days to make a final list, and then the
judge issues the judgment. So that must be done within a period of 90 to 120 days.
No judicial procedures are in there. After the judgment establishing the amounts
and preference of the credits is in place, then whoever is not happy with it can
appeal. In the appeal procedure you can have the whole procedure, but that does not
interrupt the continuation of the procedure.
MARTIN: And try to get them both done simultaneously.
ABASCAL: Yes. And we are pretty sure that it is going to work.
MARTIN: Yes, it sounds like a good idea if you can do it. The only down side
would be, obviously, because the law has been changed, but just not putting a lot of
energy and effort into the claims process itself, truncating the system which we have
done as well in the United States.
OWEN: We ought to address the issue that many of the Mexican companies, not
banks, but Mexican companies feel that the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles is
strongly creditor oriented. There is considerable concern out there among Mexican
companies as to how this could be abused by creditors against them, especially the
criminal provisions. This question is addressed to Lic. Mrjan and Lic. Abascal. Mr.
McCarthy and Mr. Loera should feel free to join in, because it is an important issue.
MEJAN: Thank you, Mr. Owen. As for the first part of the question, the new
law being mainly weighted to the creditor's position, that is a common saying
among a lot of people in Mexico. However, that is not a proper characterization.
It is not true. The main feature in the new law is the concept of enterprise, the
concept of the merchant. What the law tried to achieve is to provide that all
enterprises could deal with the problems they have. Maybe the old Ley de Quiebras
y Suspensi6n de Pagos (Bankruptcy Law and Suspension of Payments)3 stayed more
in favor of the creditors. If you see all the provisions of the old law, and even if you
read what we call the Exposici6n de Motivos (Legislative History), which is the
explanation that the legislator puts at the beginning of the law, you will find that the
old law was focused mainly in favor of the creditors. Now, the new law is not
focused on the creditors' side, and one of the proofs of this is that in the elaboration
of the draft and within the process of drafting the law, a lot of entrepreneurs
participated enthusiastically. All the professional organizations of businesses and
entrepreneurs pushed very hard to get this law enacted. They did a tremendous
amount of lobbying of the representatives and the senators. So at the highest levels,
entrepreneurs in Mexico pushed in this way. They were doing so because they
thought that this was a very good law for enterprises. The second part of the
question, the criminal treatment of the law, is a very good subject. According to the
old law, a lot of crimes could be committed under the provisions of law. It was
almost automatic that when the owner of a business, a merchant, or an enterprise
filed bankruptcy, criminal charges would follow. That was why at first a lot of
merchants did not file for voluntary reorganization or bankruptcy. They were afraid
3. Bankruptcy Law and Suspension of Payments (Ley do Quiebras y Suspensirn de Pagos), Diario Oficial
de la Federacion, April 20, 1943.
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that they would be put in jail. That does not exist any more. The new law provides
just three types of crimes, and those three are very logical ones. The merchant who
commits fraud in his accounting and the creditor who files a bankruptcy petition
forging credit are two examples of when criminal charges are now appropriate.4 The
old stigma that entering into bankruptcy is equal to committing a crime does not
exist any more.
ABASCAL: I would like to add something. First, and the Commission was very
clear that the subject matter of the insolvency law is not a tension between creditor
and debtor, but the maximization of the value of the enterprise. In the insolvency
law, the problem between a creditor and a debtor is a secondary problem. So that
was the main approach. And there are many instances in which the creditors are
prevented from abusing their position. There is now a tremendous push towards
conciliation or a quick liquidation. Because of that now, they do not need to rely on
criminal proceedings. And we considered that if Mexico gets a good law and it is
well enforced, then credit would flow more efficiently. Of course, there is always
this issue of perspective. When those who were making a profit from the corruption
that developed under the old law saw that all these judiciary procedures were just
erased, and that they were not going to be able to maneuver, they said, "Come on
now, it's not going to be possible to delay the meeting of creditors, and this is to the
detriment of the debtors." I say that is exactly what we wanted to avoid. It is not
suggested that there was a balance. From that perspective, now the law is more open
to creditors. But the only thing that the law did was to create the balance.
Regarding criminal prosecution, the reason that creditors file criminal complaints
is because they knew that they had little power in civil proceedings under the old
bankruptcy law. Now creditors are not going to need criminal complaints. On the
other hand, this law only describes the crimes, but doesn't enter into the proceedings
of how to pursue them, which was one of the big problems in criminal law in
Mexico before. Finally, we made a distinction predicated on a very famous United
States case. The distinction is between the possibilities of the debtor getting an
agreement solving its insolvency problems and continuing to be pursued for his or
her criminal acts. So now the insolvency proceeding is just an insolvency
proceeding related to the insolvency and the maximization of the value of the going
concern. The criminal prosecution is a separate matter. The example was the O.J.
Simpson case, in which he was acquitted in the criminal court but held liable in the
civil court. We use this reasoning to say that these are two very different issues.
OWEN: Am I correct, Lic. Abascal, what you are saying is that if AHMSA re-
filed under the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles (Business Reorganization Law) then
Xavier Autrey and Jorge Ancira would not have to worry about Banco de Bajfo, is
that right?
ABASCAL: First of all, the whole issue would be already settled, as it would be
in liquidation. First you have the previous period of negotiation with creditors
without legal action. Then the prejudgment period, then the conciliation period, and
that allows the case to last more than a year. If you cannot get an agreement in one
year, then the whole thing is ruined and you need to go to bankruptcy. They will not
4. Business Reorganization Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), Diario Oficial de la Federacion, Articles
271-277, May 12, 2000.
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be worried because Banco de Bajfo perhaps would not have taken the position of
going to criminal court.
LOERA: Mr. Owen, you segued perfectly to the only comment I have. That is,
to admit that this law is favorable to creditors to the disadvantage of the company
is incorrect. But it may be to the disadvantage of shareholders. That is a subtle
point. The long battles and suspension of payments have not necessarily been to the
benefit of the companies, but they have been to the benefit of specific shareholders
in those companies. In several cases, an agreement could have been reached had it
not been for the "extortion" of the shareholders, who will simply not allow the legal
process to culminate in a restructuring unless it is executed. This new law, in its
emphasis on conciliation and resolution, as opposed to the previous law, is much
better, and over that short period of time, mitigates the negative impact or influence
that shareholders can have on a going concern. Bankers hate bankruptcies. We lose
money, a lot more money than we should. A company is rarely taken to bankruptcy.
What we are after is a solution of a going concern.
OWEN: Thank you very much. Mr. Kargman?
KARGMAN: Just to follow up on Mr. Loera's comment, unfortunately we get
involved in restructurings not just in Mexico but also in different parts of the world,
such as Asia, especially in the wake of the financial crisis. So some of the problems
that we have seen in Mexico are seen all over the world. To follow up on Mr.
Loera's observation, one of the phenomenon we constantly confront is the
phenomenon of the controlling shareholder and how you can reach a deal in a
restructuring where the company is controlled by a powerful set of family interests
with great financial and political influence in a given society. This poses great
hurdles for the creditors. And the foreign creditors, such as ourselves, we were
talking about the new law and how it is supposed to level the playing field. In most
of these markets, there is not a level playing field for the creditors, especially foreign
creditors. As we have found in the case that has been discussed at great length here,
these cases do drag on for a period of time. The creditors really need to be well
organized and have a well functioning steering committee. In AHMSA we are
fortunate that we have had very good leadership and a compact steering committee
membership. But the creditors also need to roll up their sleeves, understand the
local law, the limits it places on their ability to make a recovery in a particular case,
and they have to really start to think creatively, strategically, and in light of the fact
that a lot of time lapses in these cases. In AHMSA we have been sitting there for
two years or more. We have cases in Thailand and in Indonesia that go on
seemingly forever. The creditors really need to establish time lines, or milestones,
to try to move the process forward and to keep an eye on whether the debtor is
cooperating in good faith or not. If it is not, then the creditors should establish what
alternative courses of action they will take. In many of these emerging markets, the
laws that the creditors are facing really are very unfavorable to their interests. So,
the creditors have to figure out how to manage the process, how to move it forward
in a strategic sort of way, if they ever hope to achieve success in these cases.
OWEN: Thank you very much. Lic. Mtjan?
MJAN: Those problems with shareholders in this situation will always be
present. With or without a new law, it is a common situation. That was one of the
comments I wanted to make. The second one is, this steering committee or creditors
committee, however it is called throughout the world, was eliminated in the Mexican
U.S.-MEXICO LAW JOURNAL
law. The reason for that was that this creditors committee was one of the major
problems and obstacles to reach an agreement and a solution within an insolvency
problem, whether it was a suspensi6n de pagos (suspension of payments) or a
quiebra (insolvency), whether it was a voluntary filing or an involuntary one. The
logic behind the creditors committee or the creditors meeting was that each one of
those creditors were fighting not against the debtor but against each other. So if
there were ten creditors sitting at the table, each one of them was facing nine
enemies. An agreement was very difficult for them to reach and that was convenient
for the debtor, because time was going on and on. As the debts were frozen in the
beginning of the process, inflation and time were taking care of his debt. That was
why the Mexican law eliminated the creditors committee. I am not trying to say that
the creditors have no rights any more. They do have rights. They can appoint an
intervener. They can act for themselves within the trial, the procedures. They can
conduct all the meetings they want to. But the process of recognizing and filing the
credits in order to determine the position of each of them, that was just described by
Lic. Abascal, is done mainly by the specialist who has the access to the accounting
books and all the filings. The last remark is in regards to the mention of the
countries in Asia: Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia. All those countries are following
more or less the same pattern that Mexico has followed. Actually, Mexico had as an
example to follow what was happening in those countries, because all the new focus
on insolvency matters was pushed or favored by the World Bank. The World Bank
has caused tremendous and interesting changes all over the world. So all the new
legislation produced all over the world is following more or less in the same pattern.
OWEN: Lic. Abascal has a brief comment and then we are going to open up to
questions from the audience.
ABASCAL: Just to complete Lic. Mdjan's comments, yes, the Junta de
Acredidores (Creditor's Committee), as it was known, disappeared. But there is
always the possibility of the creditors to appoint an intervener5 , and if they have ten
(10) percent, each ten (10) percent can appoint one.6 The function of this new
intervener, although the name is the same, is different from the one in the old law
because now their purpose is to negotiate with the conciliator. So we can have the
conciliator and the intervener or interveners going into a negotiation. The third point
is, the way the law is structured, the debtor is not ousted, but continues to manage
under the surveillance of the conciliator.' The conciliator has the possibility of
advising the judge that there is lack of cooperation and to impose a tighter regime,
even to dispossess management and to take over the company, to dispossess the
debtor, or to inform before the period that there is no one to negotiate with or is not
collaborating. In this situation, the conciliation efforts could be useless and doing
this may advance the liquidation period. After a short procedure the judge can even
declare bankruptcy before the time has elapsed.
5. Business Reorganization Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), Diario Oficial de ]a Federacion, Article
37, May 12, 2000.
6. Business Reorganization Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), Diario Oficial de la Federacion, Article
63, May 12, 2000.
7. Business Reorganization Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), Diario Oficial de ]a Federacion, Article
75, May 12, 2000.
8. Business Reorganization Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), Diario Oficial de la Federacion, Article
81, May 12, 2000.
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MARTIN: Lic. Abascal? I know that the creditors committee idea is gone, but
these people that you said could be appointed by the creditors, the intervener or
some people call it the conservator, depending on which translation you are using,
don't the creditors that hire those people have to pay for their fees now?
ABASCAL: Yes.
MARTIN: So, in that sense, this is not fully creditor oriented. There is an area
right here where the estate used to be picking up the tab and now that cost is falling
onto the creditors themselves.
OWEN: That is a good observation. Are there any questions from the audience?
ROGERS: My name is John Rogers. I work for Strasburger & Price in Mexico
City. I have three quick questions. One is on the automatic stay, or the stay that is
not so automatic, and the fact that pending lawsuits are not affected by the stay.9
My question is: it seems that there is going to be a natural tension between those
lawsuits, which may drag on and on, and the limited time frame that you have for
resolving the bankruptcy process. Secondly, with respect to the constitutional issue,
to what extent is that a real threat, do you feel, to the viability of the system under
the new law, and, finally, for the lenders, to what extent has the adoption of the new
law encouraged you to make new loans?
ABASCAL: I will answer the first question, regarding the stay. The stay is
possible from the beginning of the proceedings, since the filing of the
reorganization, but it is not automatic. When the visitor makes a first assessment of
the debtor's situation, the visitor can advise the judge to prepare a stay. They will
have the automatic stay after the concurso (reorganization) judgment and opening
of the conciliator period. What we saw was that we needed to stop the execution,
to prevent the execution of judgments or orders to sell goods or whatever. But we
were not going to allow [the automatic stay]. The conciliation did not justify
suspending any litigation, so you can go with your litigation until the end, and then
you have a judgment that cannot be executed. So that was the philosophy; to stay
execution in order not to disburse or cannibalize the enterprise, but to allow whoever
wishes to continue with the arbitration, the judicial proceedings or whatever, to go
on until the judgment was measured to be enforced on the assets. Then the stay
functions.
MIJAN: As for the constitutional problem, a couple of weeks after I was
appointed as the Director General of the Institute'0 , I was introduced to a lawyer
who asked me, "So you are the new Director. Are you prepared to face all the
constitutional challenges that are going to come pouring down as the rain?" And I
said yes, because we had already studied all the possible problems. One year after,
I can tell you that we have not had any of these constitutional challenges. Mexicans
and mainly Mexican lawyers are very keen to litigate on constitutional matters, as
we have this constitutional trial, the amparo (constitutional challenge). But so far
we have not had any. We have identified in an academic way, several of the issues
that were deemed to be a potential constitutional problems. We have developed
some research around them, and we are ready to face whatever future challenge
9. Business Reorganization Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), Diario Oficial de la Federacion, Article
84, May 12, 2000.
10. Federal Institute of Business Reorganization Specialists (Instituto Federal de Especialistasde Concursos
Mercantiles)
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arises. This is not going to be a big problem. The threat of the constitutional
challenges was a matter of great concern. Creditors, and mainly foreign creditors,
that is one of the main concerns that a foreign creditor, could have is: what if I start
one of those new procedures and then a constitutional challenge comes out and I
have to spend the same period of time I used to spend with the old law? This is a
real concern to creditors. I am confident that this problem is not going to exist. Not
absolutely, because we are going to face one of those constitutional challenges, but
not anytime soon.
McCARTHY: Basically, the two modifications, that is Ley de Concursos
Mercantiles and the modifications to various laws that govern guarantees, what they
pursue precisely is an incentive for the banks to increase or offer credit in Mexico.
What we have found out is that credit has not grown in real terms in Mexico, but it
is not for reasons that would be attributable to the laws. There are very separate
reasons for that. The one thing that has happened is that the trend is reversing, so
if you consider the initial spirit of the law, it is obtaining the objective. Over time
it will obtain it, for loan growth on much better terms. Now, if you combine the Ley
de Garantias (Secured Transaction Law)," generically speaking, and the Ley de
Concursos Mercantiles (Business Reorganization Law), what they have done is as
Lic. Abascal mentioned a few minutes ago. If we think about it, we are facing a
crisis in Mexico. To get a sense of things, we have had more than a hundred cases
transferred from the line to our work out unit, and the effects of this is very
interesting. Clearly, with the new Ley de Concursos Mercantiles (Business
Reorganization Law), the debtor, before even considering going to file for
bankruptcy is now focusing on preserving value. And preserving value is value for
everybody. And for us we have a couple of ratios that have been very interesting.
Before the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles was enacted, we typically were settling
most of the restructures throughfiniquitos or payments in kind. Today that ratio is
totally reversed and we are actually seeing many more restructures. That is to say,
we are just restructuring the debt, probably taking additional guarantees, and so on.
And typically what that is doing is preserving value of the companies, because when
you go through a liquidation process, that is the end of that value. And the second
issue, or ratio that would indicate to you that these two modifications are really
paying off is that when you get a case in to work out and you turn it around, that is
an asset turnover ratio. Before the modifications took place, typically of a hundred
cases that would come into a work-out group, we could turn around in a year
between twenty-seven (27) percent to thirty (30) percent. With the ratios right now,
we are closer to the fifty (50) percent range. So what it will tell you is that our
losses derived from work-outs are now lower and consequently the need to reserve
will be lower and our ability to lend will be increased.
LOERA: Mr. Owen, just let me comment on behalf of the international banks.
First of all, the new law has not had an impact on whether we will lend any more or
less. It is too new a law. We are waiting to see it tested in the Supreme Court. We
do think that there will be constitutional challenges of consequence, and we are very
interested in how those will play. Third, there are generally among bankers a
I 1. Decreto Reforman Ley General de Titulos y Operaciones de Crditos del Codigo de Comercio y de la
Ley de Instituciones de Credito, Diario Oficial de la Federacion, May 23, 2000.
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reluctance to take those measures. Bankers tend to be not very hard. They would
much rather work for a mutually acceptable solution. Ironically, there is a risk that
the combination of the two laws may have a negative effect on new loans in that the
preferences given to secured lenders are so significant and every debtor only has so
much security to give. As banks are loath to be subordinate to secured lenders, there
may be less of a willingness to lend in a subordinated position to a debtor who has
already given all of their security to bankers who have read very closely the new
laws. That will play out; bankers will inevitably make stupid loans again, and find
a way of rationalizing subordination. But our experience is that in subordination
you are very prejudiced, and these laws simply give too much of a benefit to the
secured creditor. That is something to keep an eye out for.
MItJAN: I just want to add one fact to the constitutional issue. Within the
drafting team of the law, two former Justices were working, so they were precisely
in charge of taking care of constitutional problems in the drafting of law.
OWEN: Are there more questions?
PETERSON: My name is Titus Peterson, from Denver, Colorado. Does the
judge have equitable powers to create fideicomisos, or trusts, in a situation where
those are the primary assets that the debtor and the creditor want access to?
MPJAN: Building trusts, orfideicomisos, as we call it in Mexico, selling the
enterprise as a whole, restructuring, or whatever solution can be reached is going to
be adopted. The judge has no initiative in this respect. These different solutions
must arise from the creditors and the merchant. Who is in charge to encourage or
to push one of those solutions is precisely the conciliator, the mediator in this
conciliation period. Even in the liquidation process, if an agreement could not be
reached, one way to dispose of the enterprise could be putting all the assets in a
trust, selling it as a whole, or selling the shares, the stock of the enterprise. It is up
to the creditors and the merchant, or if it is in the liquidation period, it is up to the
trustee, to the receiver.
STEPHENSON: My name is John Stephenson, from Dallas, Texas. If a secured
creditor has security over or guarantee over approximately fifty (50) to sixty
(60) percent of the assets of a company, can that secured lender be forced to
restructure its debt so that the enterprise can continue even if it remains secured, but
on payment terms that are different than what it had, or is it able to go ahead and
foreclose on its assets?
MIJAN: The process or the system of the cram-down in our law is
complicated. It is one of those that have produced a lot of discussion about whether
the drafting commission reached the adequate solution. In one case, as you point
out, he is going to be the leader in the decisions. With that kind of percentage you
are mentioning, it will be really difficult to be forced to do anything he does not
want to. Because, in the system of reaching an agreement, the creditors must act
without a large difference. So, whether there is a secured creditor or not, he is going
to have the authority to control the most important part of the negotiation.
DOETSCH: Let me ask a follow up question to that. What if the secured
creditor in Mr. Stephenson's question has twenty (20) percent? How will the cram-
down work?
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McCARTHY: There is an article here, which is 160,12 and you need one
individual with security. If he does not subscribe to the convenio (agreement), he
does not have to subscribe to it. So, what he can do is either realize on the asset or
be paid against his debt. So basically your question, Mr. Doetsch, is can you hold
up the whole thing? Yes, unless he settles in that manner.
LOERA: And it would appear that that is an inconsistency with the general spirit
of the new law. Indeed, any secured creditor, for whatever amount, even if ninety
(90) percent of secured creditors agree to the deal, that one or two secured creditors
can say "No," and by Article 160 they need to be paid within thirty (30) days of the
liffing or the convenio (agreement), and that is going to complicate matters.
OWEN: Yes, a question right here?
AIZA: My name is Carlos Aiza, from Mexico City. The position of a secured
creditor that holds through a trustee has the equivalent of a security interest through
afideicomiso de garant(a (a guarantee trust agreement) under the concept that the
trustee holds legal title to the assets. The question under the new law is whether the
assets that are held by the trustee are consolidated into the estate of the insolvent
entity and therefore subject to the proceeding, or whether they would not be
consolidated into that estate and would be subject to separate arrangement between
that creditor and the trustee or potential extra-judicial sale on the part of the trustee.
ABASCAL: According to a strict reading of the law, it is out. That is one of the
things that should be revisited. Also this issue regarding Article 160, those are
points in which I would say I was defeated because the problem was always under
the table. A secured creditor would be secure with the opening of the bakery,
because he could always destroy the whole thing. But the prevailing view was that
the best thing to do was to perform the contract as agreed and if a creditor has
security, he has the right to his security. And regarding this issue, there are some
issues that are not very clearly addressed. One is thefideicomiso de garant(a, the
guaranteed trust. Another is the financing. Another is the sale with retention of
title. And then the committee was very technical. They said, "He has property and
he is the owner and that is it." I do not think that is a good solution.
OWEN: This will have to be the last question.
MARTIN: That question that you just asked is the question that I had after
reading all of this and the new secured transactions law. I am a little bit confused
now because we have these new and improved ways to create and perfect security
interests. We are going to hear about those in a minute. But if this original trust idea
is going to be the solution to keeping assets out of bankruptcy estates, I am not sure
how much these new, improved systems are going to be used.
OWEN: We have to bring it to a close now. We can all agree that we have had
tremendous presentations by the members of our panel and we are all most
appreciative.
12. Business Reorganization Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), Diario Oficial de la Federacion, Article
160, May 12, 2000.
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